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ABSTRACT
In this thesis, I hope to offer a historical summary of the discussion of the
ontology of number. I will begin with the origins of the argument, focusing primarily on
the first two major players, Plato and Aristotle, and I will continue to the major players
and positions of the debate as it stands today. This done, I will give some of my own
insights and impressions on the subject, and I will discuss which, if any, of the positions
seem acceptable and why.
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IV

1. Introduction
Since the time of Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greece, questions such as,“What
exactly is a number?” and, “If no humans existed, would it still be true that 2 + 2 = 4?”
and,“What makes it true that 1 + 1 = 2?” have intrigued many thinkers. It has struck
many philosophers as odd that while numbers are very accessible and easy to use (after
all, nearly everyone can count to ten), what these numbers themselves are is not easy to
explain. Also, while it has always seemed that the truths of mathematics are some of the
most certain truths available to human beings, philosophers have not been sure about how
and why these claims are certain at all, given that their truth does not seem to be
grounded in our senses.
Many philosophers have proposed theories on these subjects, each with very
different results. Thus, the first goal of this thesis is to provide the reader with an
overview of the most famous and important philosophical theories about the ontology of
number. Through this summary, I hope to expose, in some detail, the major intuitions
and starting points of these different theories. However, in providing this summary, my
goal is not merely to articulate intrinsically interesting theories within the history of the
philosophy of mathematics, but to provide evidence for the claim that, in some crucial
respects, many of the beliefs and intuitions of ancient and modem philosophers are the
same. Although the modem arguments in the philosophy of mathematics are
undoubtedly much more refined and developed, I hope to draw sufficiently strong
comparisons between the arguments of ancient philosophers and those of modem
philosophers to substantiate the claim that their intuitions about number are essentially
the same.
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The historical part of my paper will be divided into two main sections: ancient
theories and modem theories. In my discussion of ancient theories, it will be particularly
important to note Plato’s ontology of number as he is arguably the most central figure of
all of the theories that will be discussed. Growing out of his general theory of Forms,
Plato addressed the subject of number as a particularly difficult case for his metaphysical
theory. With the invention of abstract entities, Plato gave his name to the resilient theory
that would characterize the powerful position of realism in mathematics to this day:
Platonism. As we can see through Aristotle’s criticisms, Plato was forced to modify his
theory of Forms to include bizarre abstract ‘intermediate’ mathematical objects in
addition to his Form numbers. Yet, however problematic, Plato’s articulation of realism
set a powerful precedent, and we can still see the legacy of Plato’s theory today in the
work of philosophers such as Gottlob Frege.
However, for any theory in philosophy, there is always a counter-theory. In
response to Plato’s abstract objects, Aristotle developed his own theory of number.
Aristotle denied the existence of any abstract entities, and insisted that everything that
exists, exists in the world as a physical object. Therefore, Aristotle was forced to create a
theory in which numbers are properties which we ‘abstract’ away from physical objects.
Aristotle’s theory certainly did not settle the debate. As we will see, the dynamic
of Platonism as the “theory to beat,” has lasted through time. Today, though there are
many powerful attempts to defeat it. Platonism in a much more refined form exists as an
important theory for the ontology of number. For the purpose of more clearly
understanding the debate as a whole, it is important to understand Plato’s Platonism and
those who argued against him from the very beginning of the debate of the ontology of

number. Having accomplished this, we can examine the common intuitions and themes of
debate that have endured through time.
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Part I: Ancient Conceptions of Number

2. Pythagoras

“Those called Pythagoreans took hold of mathematics and were the first to
advance that study, and being brought up in it, they believed that its principles are the
principles of all things that are.

When many people think of number in the ancient

world, they think of Pythagoras. Pythagoras is famous for the theorem of right triangles
that bears his name, as well as for being a philosopher chiefly interested in number.
What many people are not clear on is exactly what Pythagoras thought of number, and
how his understanding of number shaped his philosophy.
To begin, Pythagoras was not, in the sense that many think of him, a
mathematician at all. One might characterize Pythagoras more as a numerologist than a
mathematician in that his study of number was more a mystical enterprise than a
deductive one. To quote a fragment from Pythagoras,
“The tetractys is a certain number, which being composed of the four first
numbers produces the most perfect number, ten. For one and two and
three and four come to be ten. This number is the first tetractys, and is
called the source of ever flowing nature since according to them the entire
cosmos is organized according to hannonia, and harmonia is a system of
three concords - the fourth, the fifth, and the octave - and the proportions
of these three concords are found in the aforementioned four numbers.

In this quotation, the first thing we can remark is the language Pythagoras uses. Phrases
such as “the most perfect number, ten,” and, “this number... is called the source of ever
flowing nature,” immediately cause some suspicion. These claims about the perfection ot
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the number ten, and “sources of nature,” seem to be either unfounded, or taken as given.
Once we begin to examine his argument, we see that Pythagoras is relating the
organization of the entire cosmos, the sum 1+2+3+4=10, and a particular musical chord,
the fourth, fifth, and octave. Again, rather than a full, robust metaphysical position, it
seems that we have fragmented assumptions and unfounded relationships between
seemingly unrelated, arbitrary, or weakly related concepts. In addition to quotations that
cause this sort of suspicion, there are also the absolutely mystical associations with
Pythagoras:
“Marriage, they said, is five, because it is the union of male and female,
and according to them the odd is male and the even female, and the five is
the first number to be generated from the union of the first even number,
two, and the first odd number, three; for the odd is for them (as I said)
male and the even female.”^

From quotes such as these, we can see that Pythagoras was not doing philosophy in the
manner that we are concerned with. While he did deal with number and ontology, what
we have of his views are too fragmented, too vague, and too mystical in nature to be of
much help. Not only does it seem that Pythagoras’ conception of number was mystical in
nature, but we can note that he did not, in fact, discover the Pythagorean Theorem, or
make any other great contributions to mathematics at all. At most, he may have made
some observations about hannonies and the ratios that they exhibit.
This said, Pythagoras did have a lot to say regarding the relationship between
number and the nature of the universe."^ In their semi-numerological studies, especially in
the realm of music, the Pythagoreans discovered the relationships between mathematical
ratios and harmonics. They could see that mathematics is integrally tied into the natural
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world. From these observations, Pythagoras and his followers began to expand the
importance of number to encompass all of reality.
For Pythagoras, numbers literally are reality, not in the sense that reality can be
quantified, or that reality is ultimately based on mathematics, but that numbers are the
stuff of the universe. For Pythagoras, there is not earth, wind, fire, and water, but only
number, which itself is made up of the even and the odd, the limited and the unlimited.
“The elements of numbers are the even and the odd, and of these the latter is limited and
the former unlimited. The One is composed of both of these (for it is both even and odd)
and number springs from the One; and numbers, as I have said, constitute the whole
universe.”^
Pythagoras and his followers, though they were interested in how number related
to the metaphysical world, took this in a mystical direction that we will not follow. For
Pythagoras, the world has existence in number, not number in the world. Using his
concept of the limited and unlimited and the One,Pythagoras formed his basis for
number as the substance of all things. His conception of the ontology of number was too
far removed from the legacy of the debate and thus, for our purposes, Pythagoras can be
dismissed in our search for the ontology of number.

3. The ontology of Form and the Divided Line

Before we can even begin to talk about Plato’s views on number, we must first get
clear on his Doctrine of the Forms and how it influenced the way he may have conceived
of numbers. Plato’s philosophy began with a search into the nature of virtues in
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themselves. By this, I mean that Plato was trying to answer the questions that Socrates
put forth of the nature,“What is piety?” or,“What is courage?” Socrates was not content
with examples of virtues, or ways in which we can see what virtues are, he wanted to
know what virtues themselves are. What sort of thing is this thing “piety” we talk about?
Plato’s Forms were the answer. However, Plato did more than simply posit the existence
of the Forms, he constructed numerous arguments for them.
In Plato’s Phaedo, we encounter an early argument for the existence of Forms.
During the argument for learning as recollection, Socrates provides an argument for the
Form of Equal,
“Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something
that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or
anything of that kind, but something else beyond these, the Equal itself.
Shall we say that this exists or not? ... Do not equal stones and sticks
sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to
another to be unequal? ... But what of the equals themselves? Have they
ever appeared unequal to you, or Equality to be Inequality? ... These
equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same? ... But it is
definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal,
that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality? ... Do
[equal sticks1 seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal
itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there
not? A considerable deficiency,[Simias] said.” {Phaedo 74a-d)^

In other words, we may see two sticks which are of equal length side by side, and they
appear equal. But if we walk a ways to the side, so that one is closer than the other, the
near stick appears longer than the far one, thus creating an apparent inequality. By
contrast, our idea of the equal does not change. Plato believed that this helped to show
that the Form of Equal(on which our idea is based) is never unequal in any context. It is
by the sticks’ relation to the Form of Equal that we say that they appear equal when they
are equidistant, and by their increasing lack of relation to the Form of Equal that they
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appear less equal as we move to the side. Plato concluded that because we always have
the concept of equality, and because in the case of the sticks, this equality is fleeting.
Equality itself must be distinct from the sticks, and any given instance of equality we
come across in the world.
As we read on in the Phaedo, we see that an entire ideal world of Forms took
shape for Plato forming the basis of his entire metaphysics. Everything has an ideal, and
this ideal, which is grasped only in the intellect, is a Form. A worldly apple is an apple
only because it participates in the Form of the Apple. The apple that we see is not
perfect, it is a “shadow” cast on the wall of our perspective that resembles the Form of
the apple. In much the same way, the apple is red only in so far as it participates in the
Form of Red. Participation in the Form of Red is what makes the apple red, because the
Form of Red is what really is red, not the apple. In the Republic, we learn that this realm
of the Forms is presided over by the Form of the Good, which is the supreme Form, and
the universal first principle of the universe.
Because Forms do not exist in the sensible world, they are not as simple to come
to understand as the apparent world around us. In the Republic, Plato uses several
analogies to explain the relationships between the perceptible world, the Forms, and the
educational and mental processes we use to grasp them.
Plato’s first analogy is the “Sun Analogy.” In this analogy, Plato points out the
system wherein we use our eyes to see visible objects that are revealed to us by the
presence of light provided by the sun. The relevant relationships are that we have the
faculty of sight, provided to us by the light of the sun with which we can see the sun and
the objects in the world, which themselves are brought into being by the sun. Plato tells
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US that this is analogous to the Form of the Good,the Forms, and our faculty of
understanding. The Good, analogous to the sun and its light, provides truth, and the
ability for our minds to understand. The Good also brings into being the other Forms by
virtue of its being the universal first principle, from which everything else can be
deduced. Our mind, with its faculty of understanding analogous to our eye’s sight, can
thus understand the Forms and the Form of the Good.^
The second analogy we will discuss is the analogy of the Cave. Plato’s cave
analogy is about how one may escape the ignorant position of believing that the visible
world is the extent of reality, and ascend to the level of the philosopher who can
understand the Forms. Normal uneducated people are like chained prisoners forced to
stare at a wall in a very dark cave. Onto this cave wall are projected shadows of puppets
carried across a road in front of a great fire. All of their knowledge is based upon the
shadowy images and what they believe about them. These images resemble actual
objects, but only in a dim, distorted way. Through study and philosophy, one may break
free of one’s chains and experience the cave as a whole and see the truth, that the
shadows are only projections of objects held in front of a fire, which themselves are only
puppets. Though still representations, these puppets more closely approximate the real
world. If one progresses even further in study of philosophy, the well educated can leave
the cave and explore the real world, but, at first, only at night. In the day, they have
access to real objects, visible in clear conditions, and other actual objects. Even so, only
with even greater education can one come to understand the day-lit world, in which the
reality of the world is completely and entirely visible. If one masters philosophy, one can
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come to understand the Sun and how it governs the world. These four stages more or less
coiTespond to the sections of the line in Plato’s Divided Line Analogy.
Plato’s third analogy is often referred to as the “Divided Line Analogy.” In this
analogy, Plato divides a line into four sections, each representing a state of being and a
corresponding cognitive state. We will begin with the cognitive aspect of the line, and
then show how each part corresponds to a metaphysical aspect. The bottom half of the
line is concerned with mental content such as opinion. The first section, LI imaging
{eikasia), and the second, L2 represents belief(pistis). These sections are not knowledge,
and are not, in the sense that we are looking for, capable of real truth. Above them, in the
top half of the line, we have L3, thought(dianoia), and L4, understanding (noesis).

10

The Divided Line Analogy
Cognitive State

Metaphysical State
Form of the Good

Understanding
inoesis)
Dialectic
Synthesis
NoD-bypotbetical first
principles

L4

Thought
(dianoia)

Mathematicals
Hypothesis and
Deduction
Uses figures to discover
truth about real objects

Ideal objects distinct
from both

BeUef
(pistisj

Imaging
(eikasia)

Forms

Sensible objects

L2

LI

Images, reflections,
shadows, appearances

Noesis, as represented by L4, is true understanding. For Plato, noesis is the point
at which we can mentally apprehend the tmth of the Forms, and understand the tme
nature of the universe. At this level, we have arrived at the fundamental truths, or
universal first principles, from which anything and everything else can be proved.
Dialectic, the “tool” of L4, uses no figures or representations to aid in understanding. At
L4, the philosopher understands tmths in themselves, not through the mediation of
symbols. Plato tells us that through the use of dialectic, one may reach a level of noesis
and understand the truth of the Form of the Good. From there, one may reason and
discover the tmth of the entire realm of Forms.

Below noesis, is the level of L3, or clianoia. Dianoia is the level of knowledge in
the sense that one might know a mathematical theorem. Dianoia is not quite to the level
of L4, as the philosopher at this level still uses figures and symbols to represent his ideas.
For example, the philosopher at L3 might be discussing theorems of geometry, and for

his

purposes he might draw lines in the sand and use symbols and figures to represent

geometrical objects. However, the philosopher knows that the geometry that he is
engaged in is not about the lines in the sand, but about the concepts that he is representing
which are not a part of the physical world. The philosopher at L3 uses hypothesis and
deduction as his “tools” with which he can uncover tmths of things such as mathematics,
geometry, or even astronomy.
In order to further differentiate between L4 and L3, let us draw a distinction
between deduction and synthesis. Synthesis is associated with L4 and noesis, while
deduction is associated with L3 and dianoia. Deduction is the process of “downward”
reasoning. Deduction proceeds from premises to conclusions. In deduction we begin
with a hypothesis and reason from there towards an “end” conclusion. The conclusion is
contingent upon the truth of the premises. In contrast, synthesis is upward reasoning. In
synthesis, we are moving not from hypothesis to conclusion, but from our conclusion to
the premises which are necessary for the tmth of the conclusion. Synthesis requires a
“leap of intuition,” to apprehend the hypotheses needed to ensure the truth of the
conclusion. The process of synthesis rises from conclusion, through hypothesis, to “first
principles” which serve as axioms, or initial, true conditions. Plato’s noesis is deeply
involved in reaching these universal first principles that underlie knowledge through the
use of dialectic.'^
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While we have already discussed Forms, and we know this to be the metaphysical
side of L4, we are left with an odd gap at L3. At L4, the philosopher is concerned with
studying the Form of the Good, and the realm of the Forms, as opposed to at L3 where he
is concerned with another sort of ideal object. These objects, which we will call “the
mathematicals,” are the objects of studies such as geometry and mathematics. They are
not at the level of L4, and are not precisely Forms as we will discuss later, but they are
nonetheless ideal and separate from the sensible world. Bumyeat summarized Plato’s
arguments about mathematical sciences and mathematicals as follows:
(1) The theorems of mathematics (geometry, astronomy, etc.) are true;
(2) They are not tme of physical objects in the sensible world;
Therefore,
(3) They are true of ideal objects distinct from sensible things.
We also have a corollary about mathematicals which we will discuss later:
(!’) Mathematicals exist;
(2’) Mathematicals are different from physical objects in the sensible world;
Therefore,
(3’) Mathematicals are ideal objects distinct from sensible things.

For Plato, counting, geometry, and even astronomy are not about visible figures or
objects, but about their ideal objects apprehended by the mind. For Plato, a theorem
about geometry does not refer to any specific figure drawn in the sand, but to the ideal of
that figure which can only be truly understood or represented in the intellect. In exactly
the same way, Plato’s conception of astronomy was not about the visible bodies in the
sky, but their ideal laws of motion grasped in the mind. He believed that the motions of
the planets across the night sky were no different from the geometrical or mathematical
figures drawn in the sand, they are both only representations of true reality. This
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distinction may seem acceptable when applied to geometry, but it is very odd indeed
10

when refeiTing to astronomy.

Plato’s educational ideas were all ultimately aimed at preparing the student for
dialectic. The primary goal of mathematical education, for Plato, was to make the
student familiar with ideal objects and abstractions. In this way, he would lead them
from contemplating the physical world to imderstanding the Forms and the way the world
really is. His curriculum would begin with simple counting of physical objects, and over
the years, progress to abstract aiithmetic and mathematical proof. At this point, Plato
hoped that his students would become familiar with the use of dialectic, the highest form
of study, and progress to fully educated philosophers and statesmen.“

4. Form number and Mathematicals

As we have shown from the Divided Line analogy, mathematicals are
fundamentally, ontologically distinct from the sensible world and the representations that
we make about them. However, if they are distinct from the sensible world, it raises the
question of how they are related to other non-sensible Platonic objects. For example, we
must ask if they are the same or different from the Forms in the metaphysical level just
above them?
We can appreciate the difficulties of Plato’s theory of number when we begin to
consider its implications about units, the status of numbers as Forms, and the use of
numbers for arithmetic. To begin, ancient Greek number theory was all about sets of
units. For the ancient Greeks, there was no progression of unique natural numbers in the
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sense that we think about it today. In the more modem, mathematical sense, the natural
numbers are a well-defined infinite set. Each element of this set is just that, an element,
not itself a set. As far as mathematicians are concerned, the natural numbers are simply a
progression of elements. In contrast, for the Greeks, there are many sets comprised of a
certain number of units, and these sets correspond to numbers. In other words, each
natural number is itself a set consisting of some sort of natural-number-unit.'" Thus the
concept of units was integral to the Greek conception of number.
This raised an interesting problem for Plato’s numbers. If Plato’s numbers were
to be Forms, they had to be unique, pure, and indivisible, like all of the other Forms. But
by the normal Greek conception of number, numbers seemed to be precisely not unique,
in that any grouping of n units has an equal claim to being the number n. Similarly, each
number is certainly divisible, because it is a set made of up its constituent units. Plato
works around this problem by asserting that the philosopher, unlike the ordinary person,
counts only those things which are exactly similar to one another. The ordinary person
may count a rock and a stick as two, but the philosopher’s concept of two is of two
identical entities.'^ In this manner, Plato constmcted his Form numbers. The Form of
Two,for example, is made up of two ideal “two units,” which, importantly, can only be
taken as parts of the number two. Thus, for Plato, 1 = {11}, 2 = {I2, I2,}» and 3 = {I3, I3.
13}, and so on. Of course, this may strike us as strange, but we can see that Plato is
trying to come up with a way of showing that each number, as a Form, is utterly unique,
and that they are each separate entities which do not even share the property of being
numbers. The units that make up the Form numbers are such that they cannot be
separated, or combined with the units of other Form numbers. As a result, one cannot
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perform operations such as addition or multiplication on Form numbers. The Form of
Three is an object which is uniquely three, made of three identical units which exist
solely as the constituent units of Three, but cannot be taken separately or as separate from
Three, and is eternally Three, such that it cannot be half of Six or added to Seven to get
14

Ten.

Obviously, this strict non-combinability of numbers that was required in order for
numbers to meet the requirements for Forms created a problem for practical mathematics,
counting, and arithmetic. Form numbers cannot be added together, multiplied, or
operated upon in any way, and thus if Form numbers were all that existed, Plato would be
in serious trouble. Thus, Plato developed a different ontology for number, the
mathematical number. Mathematicals are distinct from physical, sensible objects in a
manner similar to Forms, but in a sort of intermediate capacity. They belong to the realm
of the third section of the Line Analogy, rather than the fourth, in that they are
subordinate to Forms, but still above the physical world that we perceive.
The most important aspect of mathematicals is that they are not unique in the way
that Form numbers are. This allows for mathematical operations to be performed on
them in a way that is impossible for Forms. For Plato, expressions such as 3+3=6 cannot
be true of Form numbers, as there is only one Form of Three, and it is entirely distinct
and unrelated to the Form of Six or the Form of Equality for that matter. However,
3+3=6 must be true of something distinct from the physical world, as it is an abstract
mental, ideal statement which is not true because of physical objects.’^ As we saw in the
previous section, Bumyeat explained a corollary to this argument for the existence of
non-physical objects which are the objects of mathematical truths. If there must be
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something that is the object of mathematical tmth, and these objects are not physical, then
they must be ideal objects. Therefore, by the combination of the impossibility of
mathematics being true about Forms, and tlie impossibility of mathematical truth-makers
being physical, there must exist these mathematical objects.
Positing mathematicals which are distinct from the Forms, however, does not give
us any insight into how they are related to Form numbers. While it is impossible to be
sure ot Plato’s exact ideas on the matter, we have some evidence from other ancient
sources about what Plato believed. There is some evidence of unwritten lectures called
On the Good, in which Plato addressed this very issue. While it is still impossible to be
sure. it has been suggested that in On the Good, Plato “reduced Forms to numbers.” This
idea is quite controversial, and not at all certain, but it suggests that Plato may have
resolved the problem of the relation of numbers to Forms by placing niunbers as more
ultimate than Forms.

Others believe that Plato may have identified the Form of the

Good with the One. This possibility stems from the great emphasis on mathematical
training in Plato’s educational curriculum, in addition to the ways in which abstract
mathematics are integrally tied to the realm of the Forms.
We may also briefly consider how Plato answered the question of where these
mathematicals came from. Like many ancient mathematicians, and in the spirit of his
emphasis on first principles, Plato attempted to generate a series from certain basic
premises. According to Aristotle, Plato generated the series of Form numbers from two
principles, the one, and the indefinite two.

By taking the Form of one, and performing

the operation of doubling upon it, Plato generated the powers of two and the even
numbers. From this, he could add the one to these numbers to generate the odd numbers.
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Exactly how such operations could be performed on Forms and how this fits in with the
theory of Forms in general is unclear at best. It is also interesting to note the similarity of
19

the one and indefinite two to the Pythagorean limited and unlimited principles,

On this

subject in particular, Plato seemed to veer towards the numerology of his predecessors.
In any case, Plato’s approach to the ontology of number set an important
precedent which philosophers have had to contend with ever since, as it indeed seems
plausible that the ontological status of numbers is separate from that of objects Plato
would have classed in LI or L2. Platonism in mathematics, in one form or another, is
still a powerful, and widely held position.

5. Aristotle’s Anti-Platonic Metaphysics

Aristotle was the original anti-Platonist. Although his own metaphysical
positions changed over the course of his life, he remained consistently hostile to any and
all platonic positions which posited extra-sensory entities such as the Forms and Form
numbers, and intermediates. Aristotle was absolutely against any sort of “ideal object”
which exists outside of sensible reality. Even his own divinity, the “Unmoved Mover”
did not occupy a position outside of the universe. Aristotle’s metaphysics began right
here at home.
In the Categories, Aristotle argues that the things that are most real, and thus are
most accurately described as “substance” are the things which we can see and touch.
However, not everything we can observe is a substance. He saw that some things exist as
composites of parts, and others exist as whole entities, iixeducible to constituent parts.
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Those things which are not composed must therefore be basic, because they cannot be
reduced to smaller, or more basic things themselves. For Aristotle, these sorts of
iiTeducible wholes are “substances. For Aristotle, substances are particular, specific
things such as this book, or that stone. These paiticulars or “this’s”, such as the specific
man Socrates, are what is basic in the universe. Non-specific objects, such as “books” or
stones , however, are not substances in the same sense as particulars. These species and
groupings depend upon primai'y substances for their existence, and thus they are
secondary to them. While “man” is a secondary substance, Socrates is a primary
substance belonging in that class of man.
Aristotle arrived at this distinction by looking to ordinary language and reflecting
upon the way we predicate things such as “man” of instances of men, such as Socrates.
In addition to primary and secondary substances, Aristotle distinguished substances from
predicates which can only exist “in” a subject. White is not a substance, but can be
predicated of a substance, and thus it is called a property. Finally, in much the same way
that there are primary and secondary substances, there are secondary properties which are
classes of properties, such as color. Color can be predicated of white, which, as a
predicate, can only be in a substance."®
Aristotle’s metaphysical distinctions can be summarized by the priority of “this’s'
over species, and objects over properties.
“Every substance seems to signify a this. In the case of primary
substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a this; for
what is revealed is an individual and is numerically one. In the case of
secondary substances, it appears from the character of the name, whenever
one speaks of man or animal, that they also signify a this. But this is not
true. Rather, each signifies a sort of thing; for the subject is not one, as the
primary substance is, but man and animal ai’e said of many things. On the
other hand, it does not unqualifiedly signify a sort of thing, as white does.
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sort of thing, whereas the species
For white sisnifies nothin? other than a
and the aenusTma" sort of substance; for they st^tfy a substance
of a certain sort. One demarcates more
.
species; for in speaking of animal one encompasses mote than tn speaking
of man. {Categories, 3b 10 — 3b24)

For our purposes, it is vitally important to remember that Aristotle placed the position of
ontologically priority upon primary substances or particulars, or “this’s,” as Aristotle
referred to them above. This is because, for Aristotle, the things that really exist are
perceptible objects, and therefore, his theory of number is based upon perceptible objects
rather than non-perceptible ideal objects. As his

own

position places ontological priority

in the perceptible world, Aristotle rejects the notion of ideal entities such as Plato’s
Forms.

6. Aristotelian Number

In the Metaphysics, books M and N, Aristotle lays out his own position on the
ontology of number. For Aristotle, mathematics is about “abstraction” of certain
properties of perceptible objects. The mathematician studies the abstracted property of
“three” from three of something though it does not matter what these three things are. In
fields such as mathematics and geometry, one studies an object in so far as it pertains to
the field of study, ignoring any extraneous properties that may be incidental to it.* So a
geometer may study an object’s extension and shape as it can be abstracted from the
object itself, or an arithmetician may study an army in the sense that it contains a certain

Note that by incidental, Aristotle means those properties which are not related to the
field of study at
hand, not that these properties are not essential to the object's being what that object is.
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number of men which can be operated upon without regards to any other properties that
these objects may have. Thus, Aristotle's position maintains that mathematics is not
directly about the physical world, but it is also not about any sort of ideal object.""
Given that all science is based on the abstraction of properties and principles from
the physical world, what distinguishes Aristotle’s study of mathematics from the other
sciences? The answer is that while the scientist may study the physical world by its
physical properties and such, the mathematician studies very specific properties of the
world, i.e. numbers. So if a geometer is studying a tree, he is interested in the
quantitative properties such as height, shape, and diameter, not that it is an oak or an elm,
which is merely incidental to the object. In this sense, the mathematician or geometer
share the same subject matter as the forester or painter or botanist, but not in the same
sense.23

7. Aristotle’s Critique of Platonism

Aristotle’s theory of number is clearly incompatible with Plato’s. Aristotle,
however, not only develops his own ontology of number, but he also, in the Metaphysics
M and N, attacks rival theories, especially Platonism. Aristotle tells us that there are four
options for how to understand numbers: they exist in perceptible objects, they exist as
ideal objects, they do not exist at all, or they exist in some other way."'^
Aristotle does not seriously consider that mathematical objects do not exist at all.
For ancient mathematicians this would seem absolutely absurd. The intuition that fuels
the entire debate revolves around the need for something that makes the truths of
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mathematics true. It is not until we discuss the modem debate that we will see this option
given any consideration.
Aristotle begins with the first position, that numbers literally exist in objects.
This position was held by the Pythagoreans and other “partial” Platonists (they are
“partial” because their position shares only some similarities with Plato’s). These
philosophers believed that numbers exist, in an ideal sense, but they also though that
numbers actually existed in perceptible objects in the same way that a geometrical figiir®
on paper somehow has the points and lines existing in it. Aristotle makes relatively short
work of this position, and shows that at best it may be a confused attempt at his own
position, that they exist in some other way. This position mns into the problem that the
ideal mathematical object must occupy the same space and location as the physical
object. This is a problem for the partial Platonist because they simply lack the
metaphysical equipment to adequately explain how it is possible for a physical object and
a non-physical object to be somehow related, and somehow share the same space at the
same time. Also, when we consider dividing objects, if the ideal mathematical objects
exist in the physical objects, then when we divide the physical object, we

must divide

some specific plane, line, and point in the ideal object. Aristotle says that no matter how
we divide it, it is always on a point, and ideal points are indivisible. Thus, if it is true that
ideal objects exist in physical objects, then either physical objects are indivisible, which
is absurd, or ideal points in the ideal objects are divisible, which is equally absurd. This
clearly poses a serious problem for the partial Platonist.
Next, Aristotle moves on to the second position, attacking Platonism pioper.
Throughout much of Metaphysics books M and N, Aristotle attempts to undermine the
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entire theory of Forms with a multitude of arguments and different approaches. Aristotle
believes that if he can knock down the doctrine of the Forms, then obviously Plato’s
theories on the ontology of number must also be false. For our discussion, we will not
address all of Aristotle’s arguments against the general theory of Forms. Rather, we will
focus on how Aristotle attacks mathematicals and the theory of Forms as it pertains to
mathematics in particular. I will summarize three of his arguments.
The first argument concerns the relationship between Platonic numbers and
fundamental units of number. In chapter six of the Metaphysics book M,Aristotle gives
us four possibilities concerning how number entities could bei
(I)

Each number is specifically different and unique alone with their noncombinable units in an ordered series. 2 = (a, b},3 = (c, d, e}, ...

(II)

Units are directly successive, with any unit combinable with any other unit.
(This is essentially mathematical number) 1+1=2, 2+1=3, 3+1=4, ...
Each number is unique of its kind, having units which are specific to that
number and combinable only within that number. For example, three is made
up of three special three-type units which are combinable only with each
other. 2 ={ h, b}, 3 = {I3. I3, l3l» ●●●
All of the above are possible. There are three types of number, one for each
of the above possibilities. {Metaphysics, book M 1080a 10- 1080b 24)"^

(III)

(IV)

Aristotle argues that Plato’s Form numbers are inconsistent with all of these possibilities.
If numbers are Forms, then there are three possibilities for combinability of units in Form
numbers, and that is that they are all combinable, none are combinable, or they are
combinable within the number. These possibilities correspond to II, I, and III
respectively."^
Aristotle shows that position II, mathematical number, is not consistent with Form
numbers, because we could take any two units and make the Form two, and any two more
We note that in es.sence. I and III both refer to Form numbers in slightly different .sen.ses. and II refers to
mathematical number. Plato held the belief that both Form number and mathematical number existed,
while Speusippus held only II. and Xenocrates held both, but identified them.
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and make another Form two, which contradicts the uniqueness of Forms. He continues to
argue that Form numbers cannot be composed of non-combinable units as position I
posits. Obviously, if the units of numbers are entirely non-combinable, then there can be
no mathematical operations defined for them, defeating the very purpose of numbers.
Finally. Form numbers cannot be composed of the sort of units posited in position III: if
we consider that one is made of a unit 11, and two is made up of units U and another h
which are necessarily different units from the 11, when we look at the total number of
units that we have used, we have three units before we have generated the number three,
which does not make any sense. Finally, Aristotle simply dismisses possibility IV, that
all three of the previous numbers exist, because he has eliminated all of them. He has no
need to discuss that all of these might be possible simply because he has shown that none
28

of them are.

A second argument Aristotle brings against the notion of Form numbers involves
the generation of the numbers. If numbers consist of units, then the first unit of 2 must be
prior to 2, as 2 minus 1 is I. Platonists generate their numbers from the One and the
Indefinite Two, which can only double, and a major theme of the Academy and the
Forms was that ideal objects are produced from their principles upwards, so we are left
with the position that the units of 2 must be generated before and therefore be prior to the
numbers, which are Forms."^ However, for a Platonist, Forms are in principle prior to
everything. The whole point of the theory of Forms is that there exist Forms which are
the most prior and underlying ideal principles, and if the units of Form numbers are prior
to even the Forms, then we have undermined the doctrine of Forms.
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Finally, Aristotle voices the fairly straightforward problem Platonists will have
with infinity if they identify numbers with Forms. If numbers are Forms, or if there is a
Form for each number, and there are infinitely many numbers, then there must be
infinitely many Forms, and perhaps a Form of Infinity. This problem was doubly
daunting in Plato’s and Aristotle’s day when the concept of infinity had not been well
explored yet. Aristotle could deal with the problem of infinity by claiming that after each
number, there is a potential for the next, but Platonists had to posit an actual, existent
Form for each number, and were thus caught by this problem. Also, the Form of Infinity
faces problems itself. As a number, it must be odd or even, and to quote Annas,“the idea
of a Form of what is infinite conflicts with the notion that a Form is essentially a
principle of limit and finitude.”'^°
Having eliminated the possibilities that mathematical objects exist in perceptible
objects, that they exist as ideal objects, and rejecting the absurdity of their simply not
existing at all, Aristotle can conclude that mathematical objects must exist in some other
way. This final option is the category imder which his own theory would fall. Aristotle
believed that he had successfully debunked the possibility of all other types of
mathematical truth-makers, thereby thoroughly strengthening his own position.

8. Problems with Aristotle’s Abstractionism

Aristotle’s abstractionism, however, is not free from its own problems.
Aristotle’s metaphysics posits essences of objects comprised of essential, necessary
properties. However, when we consider objects as the objects of the mathematician, we
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abstract away all of these properties, leaving us

with objects which have no essence, and

which do not form basic classes. Therefore, we can have a man,and the same man as the
object of the mathematician's study, one with an essence and the other without. Without
those essential properties, the second man would not be a man at all, in fact tt would not
even be a ihiiif; at all. This is problematic for Aristotle, because essence is at the heart of
existence under his own theory. If Aristotle’s abstracted number-objects lack any sort of
essence at all, then they may well lack existence as well.
Another problem with abstraction comes when we consider applying mathematics
to the real world. Because mathematics never perfectly describes the real world, in order
to apply mathematics to the real world, Aristotle says we must abstract out deviations of
the actual objects. The problem is that if this is the case, we cannot distinguish between
deviations in the actual object from how it “should be” in essence, and problems in the
mathematics.

For example, suppose we are studying the properties of triangles.

Aristotle’s theory says that the concept of a triangle is abstracted out from actual,
physical instances of triangles. However, because no actual, physical instance of a
triangle is perfect, how can we tell from these instances what a perfect triangle is
supposed to be like? One drawn triangle may have interior angles that add up to 180.3°,
while another might add up to 179.8°, but how are we to tell what a triangle is supposed
to be like if all of our sources of knowledge about triangles are flawed?
Lastly, because Aristotle’s abstractionism is a function of real world objects, his
view of number is limited to being a filter of applied mathematics. Plato, however,
begins with pure mathematics in the non-physical realms. This raises the question of
whether Aristotle can ever tmly break away from real world mathematics and work with
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pure mathernatics, or if abstractionism essentially binds him to the real world. This may
be a problem for Aristotle s theory because as we explore more and more abstract
mathematical concepts, oftentimes they do not resemble anything at all in the real world.
In fact, numbers such as i are strictly impossible in the real world, and there is nothing
physical that is even remotely analogous to them.
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Part II: The Ontology of Number in the
Modern World
By the 19^*^ and 20‘‘^ centuries, many philosophers had come to believe that it was
unnecessary to require an object as the thing which makes mathematics tme. With the
growing emphasis on empirical metaphysics and the turn to linguistic analysis for solving
puzzles such as number, the ancient ontological theories in Plato’s and Aristotle’s
philosophies of mathematics seemed like relics of the distant past. However, as we will
see in the following section, many of the same questions about the ontology of number
continued to spark discussion among philosophers, and some of the ancient ideas,
including Platonism, were brought back in updated forms.

9. Rudolf Carnap,“Empiricism,semantics,and ontology

In Rudolf Carnap’s 1956 essay,“Empiricism, semantics, and ontology,” we see a
philosopher attempting to view mathematical objects in a radically different way. Carnap
claims that even though we use language to refer to abstract entities such as numbers,
forms, properties, and so forth, this does not at all imply that such objects actually exist.
The words we use to discuss mathematics do not apply to special objects, as Plato would
have insisted. Rather, he claims that in our language, we have established a framework
which incorporates and makes use of such entities as linguistic items, but acceptance of
the framework does not imply that we accept the existence of these entities. He tells us
that rather than spend our time looking for the objects to which these words apply, the
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only really relevant questions that can be asked about the use of such frameworks and
entity-words are matters of practical application and usefulness. As we will see, Carnap
does not even think it makes sense to ask,“Do numbers exist?” in the ontological sense
that Plato and Aristotle discussed. In fact, the only sort of sensible question we can ask
„32

is. How useful is the linguistic framework of numerical discussion?
Carnap begins by distinguishing between internal questions that are asked and
answered from within a framework, and external questions about the reality or status of
the system of entities as a whole. Internal questions are those which articulate some
aspect of the way a system or framework works, laying out the nature of the relationship
between objects of speech. For example, the assertion, “There are two red books,” is an
internal assertion. It states the fact, within the framework of properties, there are two
books which share the property of being red. This statement is internal because after
accepting the framework of property-talk and thing-talk, to state that there are two red
books is simply to associate the thing-books with the property-red. There is no mention
or association with anything metaphysical, and there is no “from the outside” perspective
needed. However, the philosophical interpretation involving the reality of physical
objects and properties is external.'*^
Carnap then directs this distinction between internal and external questions
towards questions of number. Taken as an internal claim,“There are numbers,” is simply
a statement that the framework of discussion includes talk about numbers; that is, within
our framework, the term “numbers” has referents. Thus, taken internally, this statement
is trivially true. This is because internally, the question,“Are there numbers?” would
really be asking, “If we were to accept the framework of numbers, would we find that it
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ernpiy)v
questions are all subject to logical or empirical study, and in the case

of the

rriath
*^^iical framework. are questions for the mathematicians. Once we have
the
framework of numbers, all remaining questions are essentially ones of the
^ between numbers and other mathematical systems, and strictly not those of

existence,
and so on.
On the

n^her hand, external questions are those which attempt to ask about the

""^^""Physicai
status of objects outside of the framework, and the framework itself as a
whole,
Carnap, all such questions are pseudo-questions and non-cognitive. This is
because these
questions are not formulated within any of our everyday or scientific
frameworks,

und therefore we are unable to make any sense of them. At best, external

questions
n^lght be taken as questions about the general utility of accepting the
framework

but any answers to these sorts of questions are matters of degree. Therefore,

for Cam
up. Do numbers exist?” IiS a meaningless external inquiry disguised as a real
theoretical

question.

ud [the question of the reality of the thing world itself] cannot be solved
ocause it is framed in a wrong way. To be real in the scientific sense
uieans to be an element of the system; hence this concept cannot be
Meaningfully applied to the system itself.
In this
quotation, Carnap is saying that it is essentially impossible to discuss the system as
a whole from within the system itself, because it is impossible to formulate the necessary
thoughts using only components of the system. Any attempt at such an external question
IS a pioblem self-referencing. Therefore, no matter how we try to frame a metaphysical
question, it always contains such a self-referencing problem.
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Because Carnap believes that all external questions are non-cognitive, he must
also deny that we can choose which linguistic framework to use by how well it fits with
external reality. For the same reason that it is meaningless to pose external questions
about objects, it is meaningless to pose questions about entire frameworks. Therefore,
the question of which particular framework to use must be settled by empirical
investigation into the usefulness and efficiency of adopting it. Rather than a yes-no
I

question as to whether or not a linguistic framework should be used, or whether or not it
reflects reality, Carnap insists that acceptance of a linguistic framework and the entities
therein will be the result of asking a question about the degree of usefulness of the

I
framework as compared with other frameworks, a question that has nothing to do with
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the existence or non-existence of anything in the metaphysical sense.
Throughout his paper, Carnap details how systems, such as that of numbers,
propositions, properties, and the spatio-temporal coordinate system for physics are all
linguistic frameworks that refer, internally, to their own set of entities. In each case, we
accept the frameworks because of their usefulness in their respective fields, and avoid the
unnecessary work of determining the metaphysical status of abstract entities such as

4
J

numbers. Seeing as how external questions are non-cognitive, the scientists who work in
these fields have not overlooked any crucial philosophical assumptions. It would be a
fundamental mistake, Carnap asserts, to insist that legitimate scientists must first verify
the metaphysical existence of such entities before we use them. If referring to these
I

entities as entities is useful and efficient for scientific communication, then we should

(;
refer to them without letting worries about metaphysical commitments bother our
conscience.
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10. Problems with Carnap’s semantic mathematical entities

Essentially, for Carnap, it is ftitile to even pose ontological questions in the
no
external sense, because, fundamentally, they have

answers. The only meaningful

questions that we can ask about the frameworks as a whole concern the utility of the
framework for our purposes in science or everyday life.
This said, we are left to wonder if this position is satisfactory. Carnap has made
the point that for the purposes of mathematics, we should have no qualms about referring
to numbers as “existing,” but his insistence that we should dismiss the question of
ontology as non-cognitive may be premature. Perhaps from within the mathematical
framework, Carnap can make the case that questions of the ontology of number are out of
place. However, that does not mean that such questions are entirely devoid of content.
Surely, at the very least, we can pose these questions in a sort of philosophical
framework, useful to philosophers, and discuss the ontology of entities mentioned under
other frameworks. To be fair, Carnap does not exclude this possibility, he says.

“Unfortunately, these philosophers have so far not given a formulation of
their question in terms of the common scientific language. Therefore our
judgment must be that they have not succeeded in giving to the external
question and to the possible answers any cognitive content. Unless and
until they supply a clear cognitive interpretation, we are justified in our
suspicion that their question is a pseudo-question, that is, one disguised in
the form of a theoretical question while in fact it is non-theoretical; in the
present case it is the practical problem whether or not to incorporate into
the language the new linguistic forms which constitute the framework of
numbers.
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Here,

Caniap is saying that so far, philosophers have not formulated their questions in a

cientifi^’ theoretical way. As a result, these questions, and any possible answer to them,
j-eniain external, and are thus devoid of cognitive content. At best, we might discuss
whether or not it is useful for us to include new linguistic formulations such as,“having
ideal reality/’ or, “subsisting," into our framework of numbers. However, he also said, in
the above quote,"Unless and until they supply a clear and cognitive interpretation,”
which implies that it may be possible to create a philosophical framework after all.
Carnap is right to worry that perhaps such a philosophical framework would have to be
some sort of meta-framework, and working out what concepts such as “ontology” would
iriean in such a linguistic structure could be problematic. However, to say that
philosophical ontology-talk is entirely non-cognitive seems premature.
In spite of Carnap’s concession, it seems ridiculous that he rejects ontological
questions because they are not part of the scientific framework that is used by
mathematicians and physicists. In doing this, Carnap has implied that the scientific
framework is the one against which everything should be measured. He seems to be
assuming that questions are only valid if they are specifically scientific in nature. In
fields such as theology and morality, it would be ridiculous to grant the scientific
framework privileged status, as some of the assumptions and discussions internal to those
fields are necessarily unscientific in nature. For example, the vast majority of religious
beliefs hang upon the existence of non-physical, non-empirical entities, but it is
ridiculous to claim that just because such entities are not susceptible to scientific inquiry,
we must conclude that talking about them at all is nonsense. Carnap seems to be begging
the question in that he assumes an empiricist epistemology, and based on that, he rejects
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even u,lk of any non-empirical epistemology or metaphysics on the grounds that we
cannot have empirical knowledge of those matters. Yet he gives us no reason why we
should adopt the framework of empiricist epistemology m the first place.
Besides, as mentioned earlier, we do have a way of talking about ontology. In the
same way that talk about propositions constitutes a framework involving the entities of
propositions and properties, so too it seems fairly obvious that metaphysical propositions
can constitute a meta-framework suitable and appropriate for addressing the subjects of
other frameworks.
Thus, while Carnap has made a good case for the notion that we can use entitytalk in everyday and scientific contexts without worrying that we might be committing
ourselves to dubious metaphysical objects, his claims about the non-cognitive nature of
metaphysical questions seem to suppose, arbitrarily, that there is no such thing as a
philosophical framework. As we will see with the next philosopher, Gottlob Frege, it
seems that there may be such a philosophical framework available to modem
philosophers.

11. Gottlob Frege,“The concept of number

Frege is often considered one of the primary modem Platonists in the discussion
ot the ontology of number. He attempts to make the case that arithmetic truths area
priori. In his 1884 piece, “The concept of number,” he claims that numbers are
equivalence classes. That is, for Frege, each number is essentially a set which i
equinumerous with all the things that the number is predicated of. However, to
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understand what Frege means by this, we first need to examine the argument he used to
justify it.
After he has made all of the appropriate definitions of the sets that have the
required cardinality, and has explained how the equivalence classes are to be constmcted,
Frege shows that there is a logical constmct that shares many of the properties with
which we are familiar when we use numbers. Frege begins with the following statements
for zero and one respectively:
“the number 0 applies to a concept if, no matter what a is, a does not fall under
this concept.”
“the number 1 applies to a concept if it is not the case that no matter what
a is. Cl does not fall under F, and if from the statement 'a falls under F,’
,,37
and "b falls under F,’ it always follows that a and b are the same.
By themselves, such statements do not explain what sort of object numbers are, but these
statements at least give us an important criterion forjudging what can be a number:
namely, a number must be the sort of thing that applies to a concept.
However, when we say, “applies to a concept,” Frege insists, we do not mean “is
a mere predicate of.” Rather, Frege argues, a statement of number is an assertion about a
concept. He says that when we use numbers, such as in the statement,“the number 1,”
we use 1 as an object, not as a predicate. This sets up the number to be an entity in its
own right, not a property attributed to something. Likewise, in normal language, Frege
claims that we can reconstruct our sentences such that we use numbers in a nonattributive way. For example,“I have three marbles,” can be changed to, “The number of
marbles I have is three. In such constructions, Frege means the “is” as a statement of
equivalence of the objects,“number of marbles I have,” and,“three.” Therefore,
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iiny particular number by placing two concepts in a one-to-one correspondence with one
another:
“the number which applies to the concept F is the extension of the concept
‘equinumeroLis with the concept F.

can see how Frege is trying to show how all of the familiar relations that numbers can
have to one another are captured by operations on the extensions of concepts: they can
he equal, and one can be greater than or less than the other. At this point, we can
establish that any given number is the equivalence class of concepts which share the same
cardinality; from our definitions so far, we have that “the same number applies to the
concept F as to the concept G“ is true if and only if “the extension of the concept
cquinumerous with the concept F' is the same as the extension of the concept
39

‘equinumerous with the concept G’” IS
i true.

Notice that Frege’s use of one-to-one

correspondence escapes any reference to numbering, as one doesn’t have to have any
concept of counting or numbering at all to see that if two sets of objects match up one-toone, then the extensions of the two sets are equal.
Now that we have defined the necessary relations between concepts that give our
numbers their required properties, we can define each of the individual numbers. Recall
that for zero, we must have a concept under which nothing falls. Frege defines zero by,
‘0 is the number which applies to the concept ‘unequal to itself,”’ because it is clearly
impossible for anything to fall under this concept. We must note that Frege writes, “In
defining 0, I could have taken any other concept under which nothing falls.” Any such
concept would work equally well, but because this one is clear and obvious, it suits our
40

purpose well.
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Next, Frege defines the relation that is shared by two adjacent numbers in the
series of natural numbers of the form,

immediately follows m in the series of natural

numbers" as:
"there is a

concept F and an object .v falling under it such that the number
which applies to the concept F is n, and that the number which applies to
the concept ‘falling under F but not identical with a’ is m.”

From this definition, we can deduce that a number immediately follows 0 in the series of
natural numbers: if we define 1 as the concept, “equal to 0,” we get that 1 immediately
follows 0 in the series of natural numbers/*
Now these definitions are rather difficult to follow, but if we phrase them in terms
of standard set notation, as many others such as Benacerraf have, their meanings become
quite clear. Take, for example, the claim that 1 follows 0. If we take the concept F to be
“equal to 0,” and take 0 to be the empty set, we get the above quote to mean:
“there is a concept F(F ={0})and an object a falling under it(x € {0}
)such that the number which applies to the concept F is n (s.t. 1 = n, n =
F ), and that the number which applies to the concept ‘falling under F but
not identical with a’ is m.”(and 0= m,m = G where G ={y € {0} but
})

But we know that “unequal to itself’ is 0, and there is only one empty set, so x ^ y really
does mean “unequal to itself’, so 0 must apply to the concept G. Therefore, 1 follows 0
in the series of natural numbers.
From these definitions, Frege proves several theorems such as, “If a inunediately
follows 0 in the series of natural numbers, then a = 1,” and, “If 1 is the number which
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applies to a concept, then there is an object which falls under that concept,

From these

fairly straightforward theorems and the above definitions, we can generate the natural

38

ion, the resulting progression
numbers in a recursive fashion. Again, in set theoretic notation
would be:
0= 0,

{0} = 1,

{{0}}=2,

Frege concludes his argument with a short discussion of infinite numbers, and defines Xq
the number which applies to the concept “finite number,” and is itself an infinite one.
Frege also notes that, as he had hoped, he has not introduced any observed facts in the
formulation of his argument, and thus his result is a priori in nature,
In essence, Frege sets up an argument for the existence of number entities based
on set theory. Obviously Plato did not have the tool of set theory, so it is plain that
Frege’s Platonism is different from ancient Platonism, but the essential nature of being
entity-based remains. Frege’s hope was to show that such a set theoretic system could
not only be created which functions sufficiently well as the basis for numbers, but to
show that it could be done through logical manipulation alone. Frege took such care to
make his system through logic without actual reference to established set theory because
he wanted to be certain that the entire process remained strictly a/jr/on and logic based.

12. Benacerraf,“What numbers could not be’

Just as we have seen Frege articulating a modem version of Platonism, we should
also expect to find other philosophers arguing directly against them. In his 1965 article,
“What numbers could not be,” Paul Benacerraf makes the case that numbers cannot be
●sets as Frege believed. He begins with an illustration of how, if we pursue an exact
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definition of numbers in terms of sets, we run into unsolvable problems. His negative
case made, he then provides some ideas about how to think about numbers differently.
Benacerraf begins with a thought experiment about the education of two children.
They are taught from the beginning about logic and sets, and at first, completely sheltered
from any notion of counting. When they were introduced to the concept of numbers, it
was entirely in the context of set theory. Because they began with logic and set theory, it
was simple to define a set called “the naturals” upon which there is a relation of less than,
which is transitive (If a<b and b<c, then a<c), antisymmetric (It is never true that a<b and
b<a), and iiTeflexive (It is never taie that a<a). For them, the number one was simply the
least element of the naturals that is matched one to one with the number-words that we
are familiar with. The successor relation, greater than relation, and all other necessary
operations and relations could easily be explicitly translated into set theoretic operations
and relations. Finally, after this education based in set theory, the children needed to be
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taught about counting.

Benacerraf describes two types of counting, transitive and intransitive counting.
Transitive counting requires an object of the counting, such as,“One potato, two potato,
three potato,” whereas intransitive counting requires none, i.e. “One,two,three, four,...’
In order to count intransitively, we must have a recursive way of producing our notation,
as we can never mn out of numbers, and we must always be able to generate the next
number in our series. This noted, in order to count transitively, we must be able to count
intransitively, and then match each number that we have generated up with a member of
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the set of things that we are counting.
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With this distinction made, and the children having been taught to count
transitively and intransitively, the children are able to use numbers in the same manner
that vve do. They have the ability to generate notation recursively, they have defined a
successor relation, they have all of our normal mathematical operators, and they can
count and use numbers in any way that we can. Benacerraf assures us that this sort of
reduction to set theory has been done before, and is fairly well established.
It is at this point that we arrive at a problem. The two children, when talking
about some of the properties of their numbers have a disagreement. One of the children
claims that the number 3 is an element of the number 5, and in fact the number 5 has 5
elements, while the other child claims that each number has only one element. The
problem is that each child defined his numbers as different sets. The first child started
with the unit set of the empty set, and each subsequent element contained the unit set of
the empty set along with all of the previous numbers:

The second child, however, started with the unit set of the empty set and each successive
member was simply the set that contains the previous member:

As we can see, each of these two definitions works equally well but has different
properties. In fact, to use BenaceiTafs exact words,
“Each was taught which object - whose independent existence he was able
to prove - was the number 3. Each was given an account of the meaning
(and reference) of number words to which no exception could be taken
and on the basis of which all that we know about or do with numbers
could be explained. Each was taught that some particular set of objects
contained what people who use number words were really referring to.
But the sets were different in each case. And so were the relations defined
on these sets - including crucial ones, like cardinality and the like.
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In other words, for one child, the number five will have cardinality five, while the other
child's number five will have cardinality of one. This is because for the first child, the
number tive is the set that contains exactly five elements, all generated from the empty
set as we have seen before. On the other hand, the second child’s number five is simply
the empty set nested within five sets, and therefore his numbers all have cardinality of
one, because they all have exactly one element.
Benacerrat has shown that for each of the children, and indeed for any definition
of number that is essentially based on set theory in this manner,each number is identical
to some set. The problem is that there are two, and possibly infmitely many,sets of sets
which can be our numbers. These sets have different properties, and thus cannot be
mutually identical. So what we are left with, is that apparently (0,{0},{0,{0)11 = 3 =
{{{0}}} in the identity sense of “equals.” This is obviously impossible.
Given that it is impossible for multiple sets to be the numbers, we are left with
two possibilities: there is a particular set which really is the numbers, or numbers are not
sets. Benacerraf argues that if there is a single set that really is the numbers,then there
must be arguments in support of that fact.* Yet, when looking for arguments that would
show that number is a unique set, the only major contender Benacerraf finds is Frege; so
he tries to show that Frege’s conception has no significant advantage over any other. The
mam reason why Frege’s definition of number might have an advantage is because it is

'He claims that this is not the same thing as saying that all mathematical facts can be proven, as this is not
that sort of question. In making this move, Benacerraf is trying to avoid the implications of Gbdel s
theorem from allowing for an improvable truth. He never explicitly says that it is impossible for the
numbers to be a particular set and that there is no argument for this fact, but he does everything he can to
discredit this possibility.
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better, and more straight-forward in revealing how number words are actually class
predicates.
According to Benacerraf,"Frege chose as the number 3 the extension of the
concept ‘equivalent w ith some 3-membered set’; that is, for Frege a number was an
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equivalence class - the class of all classes equivalent with a given class,

Benacerraf

says that this idea uses number words as class predicates. Benacerraf means that
according to Frege, when you say that there are n of something, you are really predicating
a property of "n-nieniheredncss" to a group of objects. So by saying that there are three
marbles on the table, you are predicating "threeness” to the group of marbles.
Linguistically speaking, number is being treated as a predicate for a group having that
number of elements. This sort of usage is common to the children’s theories as well, as
they too are claiming that a group has three elements if and only if it has the same
number of elements (or nested set brackets, or however you go about setting up the
equivalence class) as the set that really is the number three. Frege’s definition, however,
is more obviously compatible with this fact.
Now, at first glance, it may seem that Benacerraf is misrepresenting Frege; after
ah. We saw in the last section that Frege says that numbers are not mere predicates of
concepts and can be used as objects in sentences. However, Benacerraf is correctly
describing Frege, for Frege says that the actual numbers are objects just as they are for
the children, but the number words, when used in normal language, end up having to be
class predicates for Frege anyway, as Benacerraf explained.
Benacerraf continues on to show, in considerable detail, how number words are in
fact not predicates. The ways in which we use predicates are substantially different from
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the ways wc use number words. For example,‘There are seventeen lions in the zoo,”
does not predicate seventeen-hood of each lion. Additionally if we reorder the sentence
to “The lions in the zoo are seventeen,” the result is either a remark about the age of the
lions, or a complication of “The lions in the zoo are seventeen in number,” which
probably began as “Seventeen lions are in the zoo,” in the first place. In contrast, if we
use any other predicate in place of the word “seventeen,” we see that the usage and
meaning of the resulting sentence is not at all the same as what we mean when we use a
number word. For example,“Red lions are in the zoo,” or,“Unfortunate lions are in the
zoo,” predicates redness or the property of being unfortunate to each individual lion.
However,“seventeen” says nothing of each lion, and as we have seen does not even seem
to be a property in at all the same sense as any other predicate.
As a result, Benacerraf concludes that Frege’s definition of numbers (“the
extension of the concept ‘equivalent with some n-membered set’) has no particular
advantage over any other of the possibilities. The reason that Frege’s definition may
have had an advantage in the first place was because it better suited the fact that number
words are class predicates, but it turns out that number words do not even work this way.
Frege’s is one of the more powerful views on this subject, and having refuted it,
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Benacerraf does not continue on to all of the other possibilities.

Thus, because there is

no argument for which particular set has a better claim to actually being the numbers,
numbers cannot be any particular set. Benacerraf therefore can make the epistemological
claim that because it is impossible for us to know which set really is the set of numbers,
numbers are not sets at all.
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Besides aiiacking Frege, however, Benacerraf also offers a general argument for
why numbers cannot be sets, or any object at all for that matter; the argument focuses on
the identity relation. In order for two things to be equivalent, they must belong to the
same class of things. For example, we can ask if the evening star and the morning star
are the same star, or if two glasses are the same glass. We must be able to put them in
some sort of class together. We cannot, however, use the class “entity” to group and
classify - it is too broad to help at all. In fact, Benacerraf claims that the terms,“entity,”
“thing,” and, “object,” act more like pronouns in our language than as classes. For
example, if one says, “Hand me that tiling on the table,” the word “thing” is acting as a
stand-in for whatever it is that is on the table. We might use a phrase like this if we don’t
know the name of the thing on tlie table, or if we don’t want to mention what it is, but the
usefulness of the word “thing” in such a sentence is precisely the fact that it can stand m
for anything. As a result, statements like “{{{0}}} = 3” and “George Washington = 3”
do not make any sense because there is no common ground between the things on each
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side of the identity.

It is precisely because such identity expressions do not make sense

that numbers cannot be objects. No matter what object we put on the left side of the
equation, it will not be the same class of thing as the number on the right. Therefore, if
there really is no object that can go on the left side, then numbers must not be equatable
with objects, and thus not objects themselves.
Finally, Benacerraf gives us a positive theory as to what numbers can be. As we
have seen, any recursive sequence can serve as a set of numbers. Therefore, what each
element is, individually, does not matter, but it is the overall structure that is important.
We can note that the important thing about numbers is how they are interrelated. If they
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even have their own intrinsic properties, these properties do not matter at all in any way
that we use them. Tlicrefore, the structure of the interrelations itself is the set of all
numbers, and the numbers themselves are merely positions in the recursive sequence. If
this is true, then numbers cannot be any kind of object at all, as there is no particular
thin^ that each number is. In giving the necessary and sufficient properties of numbers,
we see that we characterize an abstract structure formed by the interrelated properties
between elements within the stmcture, not a set of distinct objects. To quote Benacerraf:

“That a system of objects exhibits the structure of the integers implies that
the elements of that system have some properties not dependent on
structure. It must be possible to individuate those objects independently of
the role they play in that structure. But this is precisely what cannot be
done with the numbers. To he the number 3 is no more and no less than to
be preceded by 3, 2, 1, and possibly 0, and to be followed by 4,5, and so
forth.”
“A/?y object can play the role of3\ that is, any object can be the third
element in some progression. What is peculiar to 3 is that it defines that
role - not by being a paradigm of any object which plays it, but by
representing the relation that any third member of a progression bears to
the rest of the progression.”"^^

So, in effect, we cannot characterize the numbers one by one, but only when they
are taken all together. This is because the numbers have their properties only in relation
to the abstract structure which defines them. As an example, Benacerraf cites the
ambiguity of‘TO”. Taken in the binary system,“10” is not the same as “10” in the
decimal system. As we can see, it is the system in which “10” is defined which gives the
symbol meaning as, respectively, the second and the tenth in a progression. So, in effect,
for Benacerraf, there is literally no such thing as a number, merely a role played in a
mathematical stmcture.
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Benaccrraf is clearly an anti-Platonist in our broad argument scheme. He spent
the majority of his article attacking the main modem proponent of Platonism in the
philosophy of mathematics, Frege, and finally proposed his own anti-Platonic position.
While his argument against Frege seems very effective, and perhaps even devastating, we
are left to wonder about how to characterize his own positive position. By his own
admission, he has not fully developed or defended his approach of numbers as abstract
structures. This lack of development, however, raises additional ontological questions.
Even if we cannot ask what the metaphysical status of the number 3 is, since its being is
only relative to structure, can we not still ask what, precisely, is the proper ontology of an
abstract structure?

13. Taking stock of modern theories of number

Now that we have explored the positions of several notable figures in the modem
discussion of the ontology of number, it seems like a good idea to stop and take stock of
the modem approaches to the ontology of number as a whole. Generally speaking,
Carnap denies that we can even meaningfully talk about the ontology of numbers,Frege
defends Platonism in the modem sense of the term using logic and set theory, and
Benacerraf attacks Platonism wholesale. I believe that in each case, we are left with
some serious questions as to the strength of the author’s arguments, and that the debate
among them still leaves open questions.
To begin, Carnap’s article does not directly take a stand on ontology. He merely
discusses the way in which we talk about it. He leaves open the possibility that there may
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be an answer to the ontological questions about number. Of course, as far as he was
concerned, until u e have a philosophical framework of discussion formed which is
capable of discussing ontology, we should dismiss the entire discussion as non-cognitive.
However, this still leaves open the question of whether it is possible to formulate a sort of
“meta" framework w hose internal members are the external subjects of other
frameworks. This is not something that Carnap discussed directly.
It seems unreasonable that he accepts the ready-made frameworks of
mathematics, everyday talk, and science, but then denies that there is a philosophical
framework similarly ready for use. We obviously do talk about the ontological status of
things like numbers, and discuss the subjects of other frameworks in his “external” ways,
For

example, the question of the existence and nature of God is an ontological,

sxtenial,” question that has been the subject of debate for millennia, and it seems
extremely counterintuitive to claim that no discussion of God carries any cognitive
content. To claim that this entire time we have been speaking nonsense is presumptuous
to

the least. To sketch out my own idea on this subject, I believe that it is possible to

show that the framework of philosophy, specifically metaphysics, is similar in form and
function to any other familiar framework. Its distinguishing feature, however, will be
h takes as its internal entities precisely those things which would be external to other
relevant frameworks - namely, the frameworks themselves.
Another possible problem with Carnap s position is that it might turn out to be
Itself
non-cognitive by its own argument. In fact, even if we allow for a philosophical
fram
ework, or any other framework at all for that matter, in order to discuss frameworks
he is tacitly positing), there must be a framework already in place to which the
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discussion of tVanicuorks is internal. However, this framework is itself a framework of a
higher order than the first, so there must be another framework for talking about
frameworks of framew orks. This results in a regress not only of frameworks that must be
posited and formulated properly, but which must u/ready exist to even make sense of the
concept of frameworks.
After Caniap, we moved on to Frege. Frege's article is very careful in its set-up.
He takes great care to avoid any observable,« pn.s7er/on facts creeping into his
definitions in order to preserve the a priori nature of his argument. A question which we
may rightly ask about Frege's argument, however, is why he bothered to make it without
reference to set theory. It is fairly obvious that his argument is actually a set theoretic
“e- but nowhere ii n the article is there any mention at all to set theory.
One likely reason Frege avoids using set theory directly is to avoid the paradoxes
that can result in many of the versions of set theory. As Russell and others have shown,
the
concept of a set requires considerable limitations and other considerations to avoid
contradiction or paradox. For example, consider the set X, where X = {x|x is not a
member of x}. This leads to the paradox that everything should both be in and not in X
nt the

same time. If X is in X, then it shouldn’t be, and if x is not in X,then is should be.
mo,st likely wanted to avoid objections to his argument based on such problems in

set the
avoid set theory altogether.
°''y> so he simply tried to
Another possible reason Frege wanted to frame his argument from logic
from observation. If his entire
^'^centuate its independence

was to

^u:gument is very

based, it is more clear that it remains« priori. Logic is clearly apnoW,and
^

bservations about the world, it is very obvious that the
his logic includes no ^
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conclusion must also he

priori. Frege probably didn't want to introduce set theory

because it is already seen as Platonic, and he wanted to show that similar constructs can
be logical in nature, and function in the same way, but on their own terms. Frege’s goal
is to show that Platonism in mathematics is viable, and in order to do so, he must provide
a firm a priori way of knowing about the number entities. The way that Frege
constructed his argument, he is essentially starting from scratch, which only strengthens
his position.
we hav e seen in Benacerrafs article, tliere are flaws in Frege’s argument.
They arc not Haws in the method that Frege uses, but flaws in numbers-as-sets in general.
In his article, Benacerraf grants Frege set theory, which only gives the Platonist more to
work with, and then shows how the Platonist still cannot show that any particular set can
be a

number. FIis argument seems insumiountable, and poses a major problem for

Platonists, except that there is a single question still remaining. Though Benacerraf has
shown that numbers are mathematical relational structures, a sort of placeholder system.
sun ask what the status of these structures is.
seems that Platonism in mathematics has been equated with set theoretic
“"^tri'ctions of number, but while set theory implies Platonism,Platonism does not
necessarily i„,piy .jg, theorypositiotr

^bout the ontology of mathematical structures, the possibility still seems to exist

that theise
less pj
rather It
i

® substantive

things (for we seem

to be able to talk about them as “things”)exist in a more or

sense. This exiistence would still not be the same as Plato’s Platonism,
^^uld be much the same sort of existence that we talk about sets having.
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Ho\vc\ or, it is inicrcsiing to note a comparison between Plato’s theory, as it
penains to units in particular, and Benacerrafs concept of mathematical structure. For
Plato, each number is a thing on its own with non-differentiated units that make it up. It
IS the rclatiions bet w ecn these units within each number, namely how they group together,
^hat are important to Plato, not their individual identities as units. In fact, I think Plato
^ould probably say that the units that make up the numbers have no real identity at all,
®^her than simply being generic units that make up numbers. This is because for Plato,
the

numbers ha\ e the ontological priority, and the units exist as part of the nature of the

numbers by necessity. Thus, his theory seems quite similar to Benacerrafs structures,
but One level low er. For Benacen af, the level of importance is the totality of the set of
numbers, rather than the individual numbers themselves. Benacerraf is concerned not
the numbers,(for they are simply generic, non-identified placeholders) but with the
entire staicture. The relation of Plato’s individual numbers to units within numbers
seems

Analogous to the relation of Benacerrafs structures to the numbers within

^^ructures.
Let me describe an example to make this clear. For Plato, the number 3 is at the
level Of

ontological priority. H “cwally exists in itself and by itself, and in his theory, it is

what is
i i
in the number 3. there are three generic units which exist for the
uiiportant. Within
sole
""T’ose of combining together to make the number 3. The only interesting thing
about
units is the fact that together they express the relationship that defines the
3. The exact nature of the units is unimportant, as they are merely placeholders

which add

tip to 3. For Benacerraf- by contrast, it is not any given number , like 3,that

has
but rather it is the

natural numbers as a system that have

ontological priority.
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The siruciurc crcaicd hv ihc \s a\ s in which the natural numbers interact and form a
sequence is wluii \vc are interested in, and what might actually exist. Within the structure
of natural numbers, there are these things, the numbers themselves which are merely
placeholders that express the relationships tliat define die natural numbers. As
Benacerraf explained, it doesn’t really matter what we put in the place of the numbers
ihenisel

^'cs, so long as those things work together in such a way that they exhibit the

characteristics of the natural numbers. Clearly, then, diese theories have a lot in
common, as they both use placeholders to underpin their objects: units serving as
placeholders w iihin numbers for Plato, and numbers serving as placeholders within whole
■^tiictuies lor Benacenaf.
In fact. even the motivations for adopting the their respective positions are
similar,

Plato thouahl it necessary to posit tlie existence of perfect units based on the

‘"'“''ton that when we count, we count something. He was forced, by Aristotle’s
arguments,
combine

the non-interchangeable units which can only
revise his theory into

to form th eir particular

Form number. This was because, as we saw earlier, the

idea of n,,
units in their original sense (and possibly even in their
*^c»n-unique, interchaiigabic
f
mviseei
sho

sen se) is destructive to

Wed
through his arguments

to Pi

an

that giving priority to numbers as a stmeture is destructive

"'onism nbout numbers. I f it

h
as i

Plato’s theory of number as Form. Likewise, Benacerraf

"''e the unique claint

impossible to find any specific object or set that
'

of being

a number, then it is impossible for numbers, treated

■'''dual objects , to have on Illogical priority. After all, it would not make sense for
to necessarily be somehow unspecific in nature. One
object
Sically independent
is trend, it may well be possible to show that
tbi^^
‘'Peculate that if
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Platonism about mathematical structures, such as the natural numbers as a whole, is also
problematic Tor much the same reason that it is for numbers. If the same lines of
reasoning that we ha\ e seen in Aristotle and Benacerraf can be abstracted to apply to all
stmcturc-based entities, then each "level” that we claim has ontological priority will be
shown to merel y be the "uiuleipinning level” of the next level.
In any case, if Benacerraf is correct, while the modem discussions may imply that
can no longer ask about the ontology of a number, perhaps we can still wonder about
the

ontology of the ninnhcrs.
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Part III: The History and Motivations of
Ontology of Number

Up to this point, we liavc traced the discussion of the ontology of number through
history, beginnino w ith Plato and Aristotle and on through the more modem debate. We
can now nv,,kc some comparisons between the doctrines that began the debate, and those
today. It
idea:

belief that these comparisons bring to light an important, enduring

although modem theories are tar more retined, the same dynamic that began with

^ft'itotle’

^ criticisms ot Plato*ss abstract entities has remained.

14.
Modern Platonism

As

saw in the

’piihlic- Plato’** pos't'ot on the ontology of number grew out

°fhis
S^feral doctrine of Forms

math

He was first a Platonist, then a Platonist about

®triatic^ - though, as we ha^c seen, trying to account for numbers as Forms causes
for him. The characteristic of Plttto s theory that we are most concerned with is
^ct

^

-empiric^i entities which are epistemologically
it posits abstract, non
tis not through direct apprehension, but rather through a sort of mental

onto
Ping” process. It is this chat cteristic which carried the name of Platonism
rpoci

theories, not only of

of philosophy.
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Even ihmigh l^lau^niMii persists in a variety of modem theories, we should note
that Platonism in tlie motlem sense grew not out of Plato’s Form numbers, but out of his
intermediate mathematieals. These mathematicals. which function as familiar numbers
rio in the sense of eomhinahility and sueh. are much closer to the abstract entities that
niodem philosophers reference. Plato s Fomi numbers, which are unchanging, noncombinablc, and unique do not resemble mathematical number at all, and thus have fallen
by the

wayside as relics particular to Plato's own doctrine of Forms. Without the need to

niaintain a full theory of Forms, there has been no need to preserve Form numbers.
One notable assoc,at.on we see in modem philosophy of madiematics is that of
^^^^onism and set theory. As u e have seen in Benacerraf, Platonic theories begin with

famililar

rncthods of constructing niiathematics from set theoretic foundations and

®’*'“t»'shing a foundation for number. Under tliese theories, numbers are sets, and sets
“re ab;
■'''fact objects , and, therefore. numbers must be abstract objects as well. To quote
Frege. galling numbers like 0, 1,2 properUes of
con,
Mual number appears as a separate independent object
for thT"'
forms only a part 0 the assertion. I have already
r the very reason that
^^at we say the [nmnber] 1’ and, bv
●balled attention above to th
yp i as an object.”’"
^
■"eans of the definite article. -

As
earlier, Benacerraf s ^

ttack on Frege’s position showed that numbers are not

‘"^ets.

^‘nce Fre ge was a piatonist^ ri
tnte
eted

not only being a

pow e

ic reali’^^
but ttgainst Platonic

y,akes sense that Benacerraf s attack has been
rful blow against set theoretic formulations of
in mathematics in general.
one finds Benacerraf s arguments, however,a

con

^^Sardless of how con^'itt
''ton

can draw, at least

we consider formal sciences,

^^ch as math ematics,
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r

^ogic, and lingui''ti<-‘''> is ihai \\c s hould distinguish two different uses of the term
Platonism.” On the one hand, it can be uiken to refer to a general position of‘
‘realism,
on the other hand it can be taken to be a special case of “realism.” In the general
sense,
Pealisni in mathematics is realism about the objects of mathematics.^' As we saw earlier,
^nch realism was eexhibited very early on in ancient niathematical thought with the
“'■gument:
(I)

riic tlicorcms of maihcmatics (geometry, astronomy, etc.) are true;

(2) Tlioy tire not true of physical objects m the sensible world;
Therefore.
52
(3) They are tnic ot ideal objects distinct from sensible things.

●fthe

conclu.sion (3) is to follow from the premises (1) and (2), the mathematical claims

'■®ferreci

to in the first premise „n.st be true because they are true about something. By
Platonism in the particular sense is the position that these objects of

Hath
Ittt
th

ernaties are abstract in the sense that tliey are not spatially or temporally located.

®festi
●s theory would also fall under the umbrella of realism, and
'tigly enough, Aristotle ;

®fef,

●hath

be closer to Platonism

istotle’s theory was based on abstraction of
®maiit c.s. For , even though Arts

hiaih

ical objects, he still thought that the tmth of any

®Taticai properties
hiatb

®*^t»tical claim is groun ded
is

eal object. In this sense, he extended the realm of
^atical objects, but located these objects in the

Perceivable to include

'em
to

than most of the opponents of Platonism in modem

^orld. One modem P

«^rib

hilosoph®'

_ Maddy, though she uses the term ‘Pl atonism’

of such a “neo-Aristotelian” philosophy.
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® her position, is u propof*
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15. Modern Aiiti-Platonism

While in ilic iincicnt Jisaission of our topic,there weteonlytwomainpositions,
of Platonism and one of Aristotle’s abstractionism, todayweseeagreatvarietyof
Phil
osophers attempting: to provide alternate, non-realist theories about the ontology of
number.

:niained relatively cohesive, the number of antiAlthough the realist side has re

PI
^unic positions has increased dram

atically-

Modern Anti-Platonism can be

characterized by many different approaches,

ji-ijiiitionisni, as well as many linguistically based
upproaehes inehide forms of mu

These

''PPronches, such as the one propos;cd hy
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explain the ways that we use and talk about
*^ulist positions, which attemp*

uiath

le tokensurnatics in terms of linguisoe

Another sort of nominalism about

Ihch the objects of mathematics are seen as

u>ath
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Sherlock Holms is a fictional character who
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fiction
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correct, all they can hope for is a victory among philosophers, not

change in the way the

practitioners of the field use or even view their subject matter.
Although there are strong motivations for Platonism in mathematics, there are
similarly good reasons for wanting an anti-Platonic theory of mathematics. The way in
which we come to understand the universe is largely empirical. Obviously, we

use our

senses to gain knowledge about what is around us, and to formulate theories about how
the world works. As a result, our epistemological leanings are towards empirical
theories, because these make the most sense in regards to the way in which we experience
the world. Platonism, however, requires abstract, non-spatiotemporal objects that

are

essentially immune to empirical inquiry. These objects “rub us the wrong way,” in terms
of our epistemic intuitions. The only viable way to come to know the existence of
abstract objects is through strictly a priori means, while our intuitions about the world
suggest that all sources of knowledge are a posteriori.
In addition to being somewhat counterintuitive, the requirement that abstract
objects be epistemologically a priori leaves us with the obvious question of exactly how
do we come by this a priori knowledge. Obviously, since we cannot come by this
information through our sense organs, the defender of a Platonic theory is in the position
of having to account for how we can come to know about the abstract objects of
mathematics without ever “seeing” the number four. This is a common point of attack
for anti-Platonists, and lies at the heart of some of BenacerraPs attacks. As Katz
suggests, it may well be impossible to support a realist theory of mathematics without
merging a rationalist epistemology and a realist ontology into a single position, and
57

thereby giving up our empirical intuitions.
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17. Conclusion

In this paper, we have discussed the origins of Platonism in mathematics, and
seen the position's original opponent in Aristotle. We explored the specifics of Plato s
theory of abstract entities, involving his doctrine of Forms and intermediates. We then
looked at Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato’s theory, and his own substantive position of
abstractionism.
Moving on to the modem debate, we traced the common themes and advances in
our topic through several modem philosophers. In Carnap, Frege and Benacerraf, we saw
that the general sentiment of Plato and Aristotle’s Platonism versus anti-Platonism debate
has, though thoroughly refined, remained to this day. While proponents of Platonism met
a serious challenge in the work of Benacerraf, others such as Carnap suggested entirely
different approaches to the problem. In essence, however, we can plainly see that the
dynamic of the debate has remained the same. Platonism holds the more intuitive.
mathematically friendly position, while anti-Platonic positions attempt to prove the
impossibility of abstract entities.
There will be no clear end or resolution to the issue in the foreseeable future, as
both sides still have viable options. Although Benacerraf’s arguments served as a
significant blow to realism in mathematics, perhaps a way out still exists with theories
such as Katz’s. If Katz’s suspicions are tme, and the discipline of philosophy will soon
see a resurgence of metaphysical debate, it is likely that the old debate of ontology in
mathematics will soon see a great number of interesting advancements.
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